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Perfectionism and Fundamentalism in the 
Application of the German Abortion Laws 
Mary Anne Case*
When I arrived in Germany a decade ago to look more closely at the 
application of the German abortion laws, I did so with a feminist chip on 
my shoulder. I was convinced that the application of the laws was 
disrespectful of women’s dignity and autonomy, in ways that should be 
equally troubling to supporters and opponents of abortion rights. I was also, 
as a constitutional lawyer, convinced that the compromise the German 
legislature and Constitutional Court had reached after the re-unification of 
East and West Germany was hopelessly incoherent and rife with 
contradictions, such that it made no logical sense from any jurisprudential 
perspective. What I heard from the Germans I talked to gave me pause, 
however. No matter what their ideology or level of engagement with 
abortion questions, all sorts of people, from government officials, scholars, 
and activists to ordinary citizens, old friends, and relatives, had the same 
reaction when I told them of my project. “Abortion?” they said. “Why are 
you looking into abortion? That used to be an interesting question. It’s not 
interesting anymore.” 
This put my project in a whole new light. When it comes to abortion, 
the United States throughout my lifetime has been a victim of the proverbial 
Chinese curse, “May you live in interesting times.” If Germans, who 
*  Arnold I. Shure Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School and Fernand Braudel 
Fellow, European University Institute. This essay is a lightly revised and updated version of one 
previously published in CONSTITUTING EQUALITY: GENDER EQUALITY AND COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Susan H. Williams ed., 2009). It sets out in abbreviated form portions of my 
broader work on feminist fundamentalism and on the viability of the German abortion compromise, 
which I have presented at venues too numerous to list here and on which I have received help from more 
people than I now have space to thank by name. I am most grateful to the FIU Law Review, Religion and 
the Law Symposium adviser Eloisa Rodriguez-Dod, Editor-in-Chief Dominique Pando Bucci, and her 
colleagues for inviting me to participate in their symposium and for facilitating the essay’s publication 
in this issue. I am also grateful to the American Academy in Berlin’s Bosch Public Policy Fellowship for 
funding my research in Germany; to the many participants in the shaping and application of the German 
abortion laws who took time to speak with me about them, most especially officials of Donum Vitae, 
including Maria Geiss-Wittmann and Beatrix Frank-Bauer; but also officials in Pro Familia, the 
Bundesministerium der Justiz, the Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend; the 
Bavarian Staatsministerium für Gesundheit, Ernährung und Verbraucherschutz; the Bavarian 
Staatsministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Familie und Frauen; Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, and 
Rita Süssmuth; to Sabine Berghahn and Kari Robinson for sharing with me their ongoing work on 
abortion in Germany; to Susan Williams as organizer and to the other participants in the Constituting 
Equality conference; and to Lyonette Louis-Jacques, Deborah Megdal and Margaret Schilt for research 
assistance.
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through much of the twentieth century debated abortion questions as 
fiercely as Americans did, had found a way to lift the curse, perhaps there 
was something to be said in favor of the German approach. 
This essay examines aspects of the German approach at the turn of the 
millennium and of the politics surrounding first trimester abortions in 
Germany from the 1990s to the present from the perspective of a distinction 
between “perfectionist” and “fundamentalist” approaches.1 As I define them 
herein, a fundamentalist approach is one in which no compromise on the 
commitment to principle is acceptable, but the fundamentalist does not 
necessarily insist on imposing his or her principles on others. A 
perfectionist approach has as its goal compliance by all with the 
perfectionist’s principles, but the perfectionist may be willing to engage in 
some compromise in order to come closer to achieving this goal. The essay 
suggests that with respect to abortion, the German legal system advances its 
perfectionist goals by repudiating fundamentalism, because it compromises 
on the condemnation of abortions in favor of measures to more effectively 
reduce their number. 
I then set forth some of my own concerns about the German approach, 
from a perspective I call feminist fundamentalism, by which I mean an 
uncompromising commitment to the equality of the sexes as intense and at 
least as worthy of respect as, for example, a religiously or culturally based 
commitment to female subordination or fixed sex roles.2 The essay ends 
with an examination of implications for efforts to move abortion questions 
past a clash of absolutes3 to be found in the Vatican’s decade long struggle 
beginning in the mid-1990s to re-assert Catholic fundamentalist opposition 
to abortion in the face of efforts by a majority of German Catholic bishops 
and laity to continue their co-operation in the German compromise. 
I. GERMAN ABORTION LAW FROM THE 1970S
UNTIL GERMAN RE-UNIFICATION
The German and American constitutional laws of abortion have been 
interesting mirror images of one another for the last several decades. In both 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States in the 1970s, courts 
1  I am using the words “fundamentalist” and “perfectionist” here in ways I will try to define 
precisely, which have a family resemblance, but not perfect identity, with the way the terms are used by 
others or in other contexts. I realize this may cause some confusion, but I have been unable to find other 
established or better words for the distinction I am trying to draw, nor have I found a single, consistently 
used alternate definition of either of the terms I am using. 
2 See Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism as an Individual and Constitutional 
Commitment, 19 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 549 (2011), www.wcl.american.edu/journal/
genderlaw/documents/5_19.2.Case.pdf.
3 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990). 
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overturned on constitutional grounds legislative schemes governing 
abortion. In the United States, beginning with Roe v. Wade in 1973,4 the 
Supreme Court struck down restrictive criminal laws on abortion as 
incompatible with the pregnant woman’s constitutional rights. By contrast, 
in its Judgment of February 25, 1975, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court (“Bundesverfassungsgericht”) struck down a proposed 
decriminalization of most abortions performed within the first twelve weeks 
of pregnancy as incompatible with the fetus’s constitutionally guaranteed 
right to life and human dignity.5 According to the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, the German state was under an affirmative 
obligation to protect the fetus “even against the mother.” The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht majority acknowledged that other Western 
constitutional democracies, such as the U.S., had reached a different result, 
but insisted that, given the particular history of Germany, the need 
thoroughly to repudiate the National Socialist policy of “destruction of life 
unworthy of life”6 obliged the Federal Republic to be even more protective 
than other nations of human life and dignity. (According to the dissenting 
opinion, Germany’s need to repudiate its Nazi heritage should instead, 
when it comes to abortion, lead to “the reverse conclusion, that is, restraint 
in employing criminal punishment.”)7
Like the United States Supreme Court with its trimester framework, 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht did not stop at striking down abortion 
legislation, but went on to propose a constitutionally acceptable framework 
for regulating abortion. Under what was known as the Indications Model 
outlined by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in its 1975 opinion and enacted 
into federal legislation in 1976, abortion remained a criminal offense except 
in those enumerated circumstances where expecting the woman to carry the 
pregnancy to term would be “too much to expect” (“unzumutbar”). These 
circumstances, or indications, included threats to the life or health of the 
pregnant woman (“medical indication”), a pregnancy which was the result 
of a criminal act such as rape or incest (“criminological indication”), a fetus 
suffering from severe birth defects (“embryopathic indication”) and a more 
general “social indication” or “situation of need” intended to cover 
circumstances in which continuing the pregnancy would impose on the 
pregnant woman exceptional hardships comparable in severity to those 
4  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
5  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 39 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1, 1975 (Ger.). For an English translation of this decision, 
see West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 605 
(Robert E. Jonas & John D. Gorby trans., 1976). 
6  39 BVERFGE 1, § C (I) (1) (a) (Ger.). 
7 Id. at § A (II) (Rupp-von Brünneck & Simon, JJ., dissenting). 
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encompassed by the other three enumerated indications. It was left to 
physicians to determine whether any of the indications were present. 
Like Roe v. Wade,8 the 1975 Bundesverfassungsgericht abortion 
decision resulted in considerable controversy and political agitation. 
Statistics indicating that over 80 percent of reported abortions performed 
under the indications regime fell under the so-called social indication led 
opponents of abortion to claim that the law was being applied too liberally. 
As in the United States, abortions were as a practical matter easier to obtain 
in some regions of the country than in others. Particularly in the more 
conservative, Catholic regions of Germany, women had more difficulty 
obtaining abortions and doctors who accommodated them risked 
prosecution. Abortion rights advocates described as a witch hunt the widely 
publicized 1988 criminal trial of a doctor from the small Bavarian town of 
Memmingen charged with more than 150 instances of unwarranted use of 
the social indication.9 Women, too, risked prosecution, among them not 
only the Memmingen doctor’s patients, but West German women who 
traveled for their abortions to the less-restrictive Netherlands and were met 
at the border on their return by police searching for evidence they had had 
an abortion while abroad.10
Nevertheless, it took the re-unification of East and West Germany to 
prompt the German legislature and court systematically to revisit the 
abortion question. In the period from 1972 until unification, women in the 
German Democratic Republic had available to them not only what 
amounted to abortion on request in the first trimester but also free 
contraception and a much more extensive and readily available system of 
state-sponsored childcare than was available to women in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. So attached were the East Germans to this aspect of 
their laws that, even though at the moment of unification in 1990 virtually 
all other East German laws vanished in an instant to be replaced by their 
West German counterparts, the East German abortion laws remained 
temporarily in place, applicable only to women from the former East 
Germany for a two year moratorium period during which the united 
German legislature was to seek a compromise solution. Of course, anyone 
who took constitutional law seriously had to wonder exactly what sort of 
compromise could be possible, given that the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s 
1975 decision rested in part on the Basic Law’s Article 1 guarantee of the 
inviolability of human dignity, which, as a reaction against Nazi violations 
8  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
9 See, e.g., Joel Connelly, German Women’s Dilemma; New Nation Confronts Abortion, Other 
Issues, SEATTLE-POST INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 5, 1990, at A1. 
10 See, e.g., Tamara Jones, Social Policy; Wall Still Divides Germany on the Abortion Question,
LOS ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 19, 1991, at A4. 
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of human dignity, had explicitly been declared in Article 79 (3) of the Basic 
Law to be unamendable.11
II. THE POST-UNIFICATION COMPROMISE
As it had been in the 1970s, the German federal legislature, now 
augmented by representatives from the former East Germany, was more 
willing than the Bundesverfassungsgericht to liberalize access to abortion. 
It also insisted, however, that its 1992 Act for the Protection of Prenatal/
Developing Life, Promotion of a More Child-Friendly Society, Assistance 
in Pregnancy Conflicts, and Regulation of Pregnancy Terminations, 
colloquially known as the Pregnant Women’s and Family Assistance Act,12
would be more effective at preventing abortion than the prior legislative 
framework had been. At the center of the new framework was a retooled 
version of a counseling requirement for pregnant women which had also 
formed part of the legislation rejected by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in 
1975. The Act also included a congeries of provisions designed to reduce 
the need for abortion, including mandated increases (at least as compared to 
what was previously available in West Germany, though not East Germany) 
in the availability of day care and social assistance such as vocational 
training and greater protection in housing and employment for pregnant 
women and the mothers of young children. 
In its Judgment of May 28, 1993, the Bundesverfassungsgericht upheld 
central features of the proposed counseling scheme, while insisting on the 
revision of other features to make them more unambiguously pro-life.13 By 
the terms of the Pregnant Women’s and Family Assistance Act, a woman 
who wished to obtain an abortion within the first twelve weeks of 
pregnancy was required to present herself at a government approved and 
government funded counseling center for counseling to resolve what was 
described as her “situation of conflict.” At the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s 
insistence, the counseling could not be merely informational; rather “the 
counselors must try to encourage the woman to continue her pregnancy and 
show her opportunities for a life with the child.”14 The court contemplated 
that the counseling, and that legislation more broadly, should take into 
11  GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC
LAW], May 23, 1949, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at arts. 1 (1), 79 (3) (Ger.). 
12  Gesetz zum Schutz des vorgeburtlichen/werdenden Lebens, zur Förderung einer 
kinderfreundlicheren Gesellschaft, für Hilfen im Schwangerschaftskonflikt und zur Regelung des 
Schwangerschaftsabbruchs [Schwangeren- und Familienhilfegesetz] [Pregnant Women’s and Family 
Assistance Act], 1992, BGBL. I at 1398. 
13  88 BVERFGE 203 (Ger.). An official English translation is available at www.bundesverfassun
gsgericht.de/en/decisions/fs19930528_2bvf000290en.html. Further citations from this opinion in this 
essay will be to this official translation. 
14 Id. at 217. 
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account all of the pressures that might bear on a woman, including external 
pressures from family members, sexual partners, landlords, employers, and 
creditors. Upon completion of the counseling, the woman would receive a 
certificate in effect permitting her to obtain a first trimester abortion without 
risk of criminal sanctions. She no longer had to obtain third-party 
certification of the existence of one of the four approved indications; the 
ultimate decision was in her hands. However, because she could not be 
judge in her own case, in the absence of third-party certification, her 
abortion, while not punishable, could also not be justified; the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht insisted it would remain a wrongful act. 
Consequentially, the court majority determined that the comprehensive 
public medical insurance scheme could no longer pay for abortions that 
were not medically necessary. If, however, the woman herself were too 
poor to pay for the abortion, the court majority held that the state itself was 
authorized to pay the cost. The Bundesverfassungsgericht also insisted that 
comprehensive abortion statistics be maintained, because its approval of the 
substitution of counseling for criminal sanctions was conditioned on 
counseling being indeed more effective than the threat of punishment in 
inducing women to carry their fetuses to term. The compromise as amended 
by the court and eventually embodied in federal legislation in 199515 had 
many other features as well, a full explication of which would exceed the 
scope of this paper.16
Like the U.S. Supreme Court’s Casey decision,17 the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s decision of 28 May 1993 was intended to offer 
the possibility of a stable compromise. Although starting from opposite 
positions concerning the constitutionality, in principle, of first trimester 
abortions, the results reached by the two courts are not as different as their 
starting points might suggest—the result in both cases is in effect to 
preclude the state from imposing an undue burden on a pregnant woman 
through the restrictions it imposes on her termination of her pregnancy,18
although in the U.S. the principal reason for doing so is to protect the 
woman’s rights, while in Germany the emphasis is on more effective 
15  Schwangeren- und Familienhilfeänderungsgesetz (SFHÄndG) of 21 August 1995. 
16  It is particularly important to note that this essay’s focus is the legal treatment of first trimester 
abortions only, not late term abortions. For a more detailed examination of the 1993 decision in 
comparative perspective, see, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse, and the 
Right to Protection in the United States and Germany, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 273 (1995). 
17  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
18  Although the German court’s goal is unequivocally to discourage abortions, it nevertheless 
manifests a concern about undue burden on women contemplating abortion in setting forth detailed 
mandates about, for example, the provision of a sufficient number of counseling centers within easy 
reach of all women in Germany, requirements that counseling not be dragged out until it is too late for a 
woman to abort, and the availability of state funds for the abortions of poor women. 
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protection for the fetus. The legal details of both decisions, like those of 
their predecessor decisions from the 1970s, were readily susceptible to 
criticism. The German decision in particular was extremely lengthy, 
complex and full of apparent tensions and contradictions. Not all of the 
forms of assistance for pregnant women have been implemented as 
contemplated in Germany. But the German decision seems to have 
accomplished what the American Casey decision did not—a compromise 
many of the leading participants in the abortion debates found attractive 
enough to be worth trying to preserve, even at the expense of ignoring or 
underplaying any tensions or contradictions.19
III. PERFECTIONIST AND FUNDAMENTALIST CHARACTERISTICS DEFINED
The remainder of this essay will use an analysis of the salient features 
of the German abortion compromise to highlight distinctions between what 
I am calling “perfectionist” and “fundamentalist” approaches to a problem 
such as the legal regulation of abortion. As I am defining these terms, which 
I acknowledge others define in somewhat different ways, the hallmark of 
fundamentalism is an unwillingness to compromise and that of 
perfectionism is a willingness to impose. Another way of formulating the 
distinction is that perfectionism speaks in the second or third person—it is 
about what “you” or “they” should or must do, not just about what “I” or 
“We” (as in “We the people of the United States . . .”20) must do. With 
respect to any deeply held commitment, it is possible to be both 
fundamentalist and perfectionist, neither perfectionist nor fundamentalist, 
fundamentalist without being perfectionist, or perfectionist but not 
fundamentalist. With respect to any commitment or set of commitments, 
individual actors within a legal system, as well as the legal system itself, 
can decide not to compromise without wishing to impose or can decide to 
impose and perhaps in the interests of that imposition, compromise. In other 
work, I have explored the distinctions between fundamentalism and 
perfectionism in ongoing debates on issues including the legal regulation of 
marriage, veiling and sex segregation, and the teaching of values in public 
schools.21
Before applying these distinctions to the German abortion context, let 
me offer an illustration from yet another context to help make my rubric 
clear. Consider a vegan invited to a meal at which the host serves paella, a 
rice dish made with meat and shellfish. The host’s proposed solution is that 
19  As will become clear below, I do not mean to suggest that the current state of the law in 
Germany raises no objections or that all abortion questions are deemed settled. 
20  U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
21  Case, supra note 2; see also Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier 
Between Government and Family Responsibility for Children, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 381 (2009). 
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the vegan guest can just scoop out the pieces of meat and shellfish from the 
dish. A fundamentalist vegan is someone for whom just scooping them out 
is not an acceptable option. Some fundamentalist vegans are perfectly 
comfortable sitting down to a meal at which others are eating meat, so long 
as their own portion is completely untainted. But one who is also a 
perfectionist might insist that only vegan food be served to everyone at the 
table. And one with perfectionist, but not fundamentalist, tendencies might 
consider it an acceptable compromise if everyone’s portion of rice were 
flavored with shellfish stock, but no other meat or fish were included in the 
meal. 
As I see it, the German abortion compromise as crafted by the 
legislature and amended by the court is in important ways perfectionist 
without being fundamentalist. It began from the premise that the most 
important thing about abortions is not that they be condemned but that they 
be prevented. Given that the threat of criminal punishment had not worked 
to prevent abortions, it was possible that counseling, whose purpose was to 
protect the fetus, not “against the mother” but with her cooperation, could 
be more effective. Substituting counseling for the threat of punishment was 
thus worth trying, even though the somewhat paradoxical result was to 
allow a woman to engage with impunity in a wrongful act contravening 
constitutional norms provided that she allow government authorized 
counselors to try to talk her out of it first. 
The simultaneous denial of insurance coverage for most abortions and 
insistence on authorization of government payments for the abortions of 
poor women is similarly paradoxical from a fundamentalist perspective. 
Under this scheme, the government will not only be permitting, but paying 
for, wrongful acts contravening constitutional norms. This introduces a new 
element into the division of acts along one axis into protected, permitted, 
condemned and along another into subsidized, unsubsidized, and taxed. 
While abortion in the United States is famously protected but 
unsubsidized,22 abortion in Germany can be paradoxically at once 
condemned and subsidized. One way to account for this difference is as an 
instantiation of the broader contrast between an American commitment to 
individual rights and responsibilities and a German constitutional 
commitment that the state be a social state. 
Some might be tempted to see a heritage of eugenics in the German 
government’s willingness to pay for the abortions of poor women, a 
disproportionate number of whom can be predicted to be of other than 
ethnic German origin. But a closer look at the regulations on abortion 
22 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding prohibition on the use of Medicaid 
funds to perform abortions except in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the life of the pregnant woman). 
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payments and their application reveals the following: it was left to the 
legislatures, still in general more liberal than the court on abortion issues, to 
determine what qualified a woman as needy enough to have her abortion 
paid for by the state. The adopted income thresholds were not only quite 
generous, but also count only a woman’s own income, not that of her 
spouse or other family members, or her illiquid assets. The result, not until 
recently widely publicized, is that the state, under a constitutional 
obligation to prevent abortions, nevertheless pays for more than 80 percent 
of them.23 Again, the court’s explanation is one that privileges a 
perfectionist attempt to prevent abortions over a fundamentalist insistence 
that the state keep its hands clean: payments for poor women’s abortions 
were necessary to the success of the counseling scheme because without 
them women might bypass counseling and the services of a licensed 
physician entirely, risking their health and foreclosing the possibility of 
effective influence being brought to bear on them.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s Judgment of May 28, 1993 was not 
greeted with universal acclaim, with some feminists calling it a “return to 
the Middle Ages”24 and some abortion opponents calling it an unprincipled 
abdication of the state’s duty to protect fetal life. 
IV. MY FEMINIST FUNDAMENTALIST CONCERNS
ABOUT THE GERMAN COMPROMISE
My own initial reaction to the 1992 decision, from my feminist 
fundamentalist perspective,25 was not enthusiastic. I was particularly 
troubled that the counseling scheme encourages a view of women as 
uniquely unable to make responsible decisions without aid. My concerns 
intensified when I looked at abortion counseling in light of the history of 
the regulation of women as mothers under German law: until the 1970s, for 
example, a guardian, with decision-making authority from the state, was 
required to be appointed for every child of any unmarried mother, 
23  The percentage of state financed abortions varies by region, from approximately 65 percent in 
conservative Catholic Bavaria to approximately 95 percent in more liberal North Rhine-Westphalia. 
MANFRED SPIEKER, KIRCHE UND ABTREIBUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND: URSACHEN UND VERLAUF EINES 
KONFLIKTES 105 (2d ed. 2008). 
24  Regine Hildebrandt, minister for social affairs in the state of Brandenburg, as quoted in 
Stephen Kinzer, German Court Restricts Abortion, Angering Feminists and the East, N.Y. TIMES, May 
29, 1993, at 1. 
25  Not all feminists, even those who by my terms would be feminist fundamentalists, would 
agree with me. Like the religious commitments to which I am pressing an analogy in my use of the term 
“fundamentalist,” feminist commitments can vary in content as well as in character. Feminists, like 
those within a faith tradition, diverge somewhat in their beliefs and in their views of what their beliefs 
require of them. Moreover, many committed feminists, like many devout religious believers, would not 
embrace nor be accurately described by the term fundamentalist as I define it. 
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regardless of the mother’s age, fitness as a parent, economic or educational 
level.26 My concerns would be abated if the counseling scheme were not so 
anomalous in present-day German law. If, for example, counseling were a 
well-established, frequently encountered practice under present-day 
German law, if persons seeking to engage in a wide variety of acts were 
required to undergo counseling beforehand, my concerns would not be as 
strong. As things stand, however, pregnant women are uniquely seen as in 
need of counseling, uniquely requiring guidance in making decisions. 
Let me stress three things: First, the response of feminist supporters of 
the German abortion compromise would be that, in the end, the compromise 
puts the ultimate decision whether or not to abort in the hands of the 
pregnant woman; it can thus be seen as more respectful of a woman’s 
decision-making ability than prior schemes, in both Germany and the pre-
Roe v. Wade United States, that put the ultimate decision whether a woman 
was in a condition of sufficient distress that she should be allowed to 
proceed with an abortion in the hands of third parties such as doctors. 
Second, my concerns apply only to mandatory, not to voluntary counseling. 
Third, these concerns about mandatory counseling, are, in my view, 
independent of any underlying commitment on abortion. Thus, those who 
favor abortion rights may see counseling as an acceptable price to pay for 
the ultimate opportunity to abort, while those who oppose abortion may see 
counseling as a useful tool for discouraging abortion. On the other hand, an 
uncompromising focus on sex equality under law might perhaps lead some 
to the conclusion that it better befits women’s dignity as independent 
responsible legal actors to send them to jail for aborting, rather than to 
mandatory counseling before they do so. 
My own inclination was to compare mandatory abortion counseling to 
the West German procedure for conscientious objection by young men to 
mandatory military service (“Kriegsdienstverweigerung”), which 
traditionally had been more of an adversarial examination than a counseling 
session.27 Unlike pregnant women, young men who sought to qualify for 
alternative service were not treated as necessarily in need of advice or 
guidance, but were instead presumed to know their own mind. One could, 
however, readily imagine how a counseling approach might work. (“Listen, 
son, it’s not really so bad in the army, and the country needs defending, 
doesn’t it? You want to do your part, don’t you? Think it over. . . .”) To 
what extent do intractable differences between the two situations and to 
26 See, e.g., ELIZABETH D. HEINEMAN, WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES A HUSBAND MAKE? WOMEN
AND MARITAL STATUS IN NAZI AND POSTWAR GERMANY 151–55 (1989). 
27  This procedure is no longer in effect, given that in the united German population at present 
there are far more young men eligible for potential military service than the German military currently 
has need to draft. 
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what extent do norms of masculinity and femininity help account for the 
differences in approach? One question worth posing is whether increased 
and broader applicability of a counseling approach might be beneficial. 
A second set of feminist concerns arises for me from the abortion 
financing regulations put in place after the May 1993 decision. As noted 
above, regulations implementing the decision interpreted the mother’s 
straitened financial circumstances very broadly, such that, in theory, even 
the non-wage earning wife of a rich man, because she earns no income and 
may have no liquid assets in her own name, can qualify for state aid. One 
under-publicized consequence of these generous regulations is that, in the 
aftermath of a decision reaffirming abortion’s wrongfulness and loudly 
trumpeting constitutional restrictions on payments for abortions, the 
overwhelming majority of abortions are paid for by the state. This fact 
alone is worthy of attention. In addition, however, it is worth noting that the 
group of women most directly disadvantaged by the 1993 decision are those 
who could have justified their abortions and had them paid for by insurance 
under the old scheme but, because they are wage-earners in their own right, 
must now pay for abortions without being given the same opportunities 
previously available to justify themselves. 
Once again, it seems to me that having concerns from a feminist 
fundamentalist perspective about this aspect of the abortion decision can be 
independent of one’s underlying views on the abortion question. Supporting 
evidence for my supposition can be found in the partial dissent of 
constitutional court judge Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde. Abortion rights 
supporters had urged unsuccessfully that Böckenförde be recused from 
participating in the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s 1993 abortion case because 
of his prominent support for Catholic anti-abortion organizations. 
Nevertheless, in his opinion dissenting in part, Böckenförde objected that 
the majority had unnecessarily denied to women the opportunity previously 
available to them to justify their abortions: 
If women who are considering pregnancy termination are called upon 
to show responsibility in this way and if they are expected to act 
according to the requirements of the law, it is then contradictory to 
demand at the same time a constitutional prohibition whereby in all 
legal areas, other than penal law, women who have had a termination 
are to be treated without distinction as having acting wrongly and are 
to have no chance to defend themselves. Women are supposed to use 
the legal system’s requirements for the protection of unborn life as 
orientation, nonetheless even when they do their actions are and 
remain—by virtue of the constitutional order—wrong. That is not only 
contradictory—it also affects the woman’s person, her honor and legal 
37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 83 Side B      04/28/2016   10:11:02
37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 83 Side B      04/28/2016   10:11:02
C M
Y K
08 - CASE_FINAL_4.15.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/16 4:58 PM
160 FIU Law Review [Vol. 11:149 
status.28
In addition to sharing Böckenförde’s concerns, I fear that the way this 
aspect of the decision was ultimately worked out in the abortion funding 
regime may fit with a broader tendency in German law and society to 
privilege the interests of housewives more generally over those of 
independent professional women. 
V. PERFECTIONISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE 
RESPONSE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH29
That legislators and judges on various sides of the abortion question in 
Germany were prepared to compromise in hopes of achieving a stable 
equilibrium may not seem remarkable. More surprising, perhaps, was the 
response of a significant majority of the bishops and laity of the German 
Catholic Church to the substitution of a counseling regime for a regime 
focusing on criminal punishment as a means of discouraging abortions in 
the first trimester, as authorized by the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Like the 
Vatican and the American Catholic Church, the Catholic Church in 
Germany was strongly opposed to abortion. Nevertheless, the then head of 
the German Catholic Bishops’ Conference, Bishop Karl Lehmann, reacted 
enthusiastically to the counseling scheme outlined in the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s 1993 decision, saying, “the real winner [in this 
case] is the human being.”30 Bishop Lehmann said he was particularly 
pleased to see that the new scheme contemplated that the responsibility to 
protect life would extend beyond the pregnant woman herself into her 
family and social circle and the society at large. 
The court’s majority opinion and subsequent legislation set forth in 
detail the requirement for government funded counseling centers to be set 
up in all parts of Germany. Initially, some were authorized to be run by the 
regional governments themselves, others by physicians, and many by Pro 
Familia (the German equivalent of Planned Parenthood). Remarkably, 
however, many were also authorized to be run by the Catholic Church 
(typically through Caritas, the German equivalent of Catholic Charities). 
From the beginning, a small minority of German Catholic clergy and 
laity resisted the involvement of their Church in the new abortion 
counseling regime, taking a position that was uncompromising, or, in my 
28  88 BVERFGE 203, at 427 (Ger.) (Böckenförde, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
29  Among the most detailed historical and analytical accounts of the interactions of the German 
Catholic hierarchy and laity and the Vatican concerning the application of the German abortion laws are 
two books written from perspectives generally supportive of the Vatican position, Spieker, supra note 
23, and Rainer Beckmann, Der Streit um den Beratungsschein (2000) (including full text of relevant 
documents from 1995-99). 
30  BECKMANN, supra note 29, at 81. 
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terminology, fundamentalist, to wit that given that at the end of state-
sponsored counseling pregnant women were issued a certificate which they 
could use to obtain an abortion without risk of criminal punishment, the 
counseling centers were essentially providing these women a license to kill, 
something the Church and its members ought not to facilitate in any way.31
The overwhelming majority of the German Catholic bishops, however, 
supported the full participation of the Catholic Church in the state-
sponsored counseling scheme. Even more remarkably, they continued to do 
so over a period of many years in the face of repeated, increasingly 
unambiguous and insistent directives from the Vatican and from the Pope 
himself to stop. The bishops’ tenacious but ultimately unsuccessful efforts 
to dissuade the Vatican from its fundamentalist insistence on keeping the 
Church from any involvement whatsoever with the German abortion 
compromise centered on an argument that Catholic counseling centers had 
an opportunity to dissuade women from aborting and thereby could save the 
lives of their unborn children. Thousands of children, said the bishops, 
owed their lives to the Church’s counseling centers, and it would be its 
withdrawal from counseling, rather than its continued participation, that 
would implicate the Church in the deaths of the innocent. 
After evading for five years Vatican-imposed deadlines for ceasing to 
issue certificates of abortion counseling that could be used to obtain 
abortions, in the end, the German Catholic bishops were indeed forced to 
withdraw from participation in state-sponsored counseling, but the place of 
the Church itself was taken by organizations of committed pro-life Catholic 
laity, notably Donum Vitae (Latin for “gift of life”), founded for this 
purpose in September 1999. The Pope and the Vatican then turned their 
attention to condemning and trying to stop the participation of these 
organizations of Catholics in abortion counseling. After the elevation to the 
papacy of German-born Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, who, while head of the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith had himself communicated with 
the German Bishops directing them to cease and desist offering counseling 
certificates, his successor as head of what used to be known as the 
Congregation of the Roman and Universal Inquisition, American Cardinal 
William Levada, directed the German Bishops to stop Catholics from 
supporting Donum Vitae. Like the bishops before them, however, the 
women and men of Donum Vitae resisted the Vatican directives and 
continued, not only in their counseling, but in their conviction that it was 
31  Compare the objections of the Catholic petitioners in Little Sisters of the Poor Home For the 
Aged v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014), and Zubik v. Burwell, 983 F. Supp. 2d 576 (W.D. Pa. 2015), 
who similarly object to signing forms or otherwise participating in a process they believe would make 
them complicit in the provision of contraceptives and abortifacients to their employees under the 
provisions of the Affordable Care Act. 
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consistent with if not required by their Catholic faith. 
What lessons can be drawn from the ongoing battle between Donum 
Vitae and the Vatican over participation in the abortion counseling regime? 
Well, a pessimist might see evidence that the issue of abortion can never get 
beyond a clash of absolutes, with fundamentalists ever ready to upset any 
hope of stable compromise. But, having spent some time with the women of 
Donum Vitae in Bavaria, I think there might be more optimistic lessons as 
well, especially when I contrast their approach with that more prevalent 
among abortion rights opponents in the United States. Unlike so many of 
the counselors who lie in wait for women at the entrances of abortion 
clinics in the U.S. or the legislators who seek to mandate counseling for 
American women seeking abortions,32 the women of Donum Vitae, in the 
spirit of the German constitutional compromise itself, appear to have an 
approach that is at its root not finger-wagging, but supportive, whose aim is, 
as the Bundesverfassungsgericht required, to “show [the pregnant woman] 
opportunities for a life with the child,” not to threaten her with regret or 
cancer should she abort. 
Also in the spirit of the German compromise, the Donum Vitae 
counselors repudiate fundamentalism in the interests of perfectionism. The 
rules governing abortion counseling require state-sponsored counseling 
centers also to provide sex education, including the use of contraceptives. 
Wasn’t this difficult for them as Catholics, I asked some of the women of 
Donum Vitae, given that their Church forbad artificial means of 
contraception as well as abortion? Of course not, they responded with some 
puzzlement: every successful contraception is an abortion that does not 
need to happen; contraception may be bad, but abortion is much, much 
worse.33 Like much about the German compromise, this attitude on the part 
of Catholic activists is worthy of further study at a time when religious 
opponents of abortion in the United States are likely to let fundamentalism 
dictate their agenda, and, in recent years, the agenda of the government 
actors they can control, opposing not only abortion funding, but also access 
to and information about contraception. 
32  For an overview of U.S. state laws mandating counseling, see Guttmacher Institute, State
Policies in Brief as of March 1, 2016: Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion available at 
www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf. 
33  Personal communications with members of Donum Vitae, Munich, Germany, June 2002. 
